25 research outputs found
Semantic Security and Indistinguishability in the Quantum World
At CRYPTO 2013, Boneh and Zhandry initiated the study of quantum-secure
encryption. They proposed first indistinguishability definitions for the
quantum world where the actual indistinguishability only holds for classical
messages, and they provide arguments why it might be hard to achieve a stronger
notion. In this work, we show that stronger notions are achievable, where the
indistinguishability holds for quantum superpositions of messages. We
investigate exhaustively the possibilities and subtle differences in defining
such a quantum indistinguishability notion for symmetric-key encryption
schemes. We justify our stronger definition by showing its equivalence to novel
quantum semantic-security notions that we introduce. Furthermore, we show that
our new security definitions cannot be achieved by a large class of ciphers --
those which are quasi-preserving the message length. On the other hand, we
provide a secure construction based on quantum-resistant pseudorandom
permutations; this construction can be used as a generic transformation for
turning a large class of encryption schemes into quantum indistinguishable and
hence quantum semantically secure ones. Moreover, our construction is the first
completely classical encryption scheme shown to be secure against an even
stronger notion of indistinguishability, which was previously known to be
achievable only by using quantum messages and arbitrary quantum encryption
circuits.Comment: 37 pages, 2 figure
General Impossibility of Group Homomorphic Encryption in the Quantum World
Group homomorphic encryption represents one of the most important building
blocks in modern cryptography. It forms the basis of widely-used, more
sophisticated primitives, such as CCA2-secure encryption or secure multiparty
computation. Unfortunately, recent advances in quantum computation show that
many of the existing schemes completely break down once quantum computers reach
maturity (mainly due to Shor's algorithm). This leads to the challenge of
constructing quantum-resistant group homomorphic cryptosystems.
In this work, we prove the general impossibility of (abelian) group
homomorphic encryption in the presence of quantum adversaries, when assuming
the IND-CPA security notion as the minimal security requirement. To this end,
we prove a new result on the probability of sampling generating sets of finite
(sub-)groups if sampling is done with respect to an arbitrary, unknown
distribution. Finally, we provide a sufficient condition on homomorphic
encryption schemes for our quantum attack to work and discuss its
satisfiability in non-group homomorphic cases. The impact of our results on
recent fully homomorphic encryption schemes poses itself as an open question.Comment: 20 pages, 2 figures, conferenc
Shufflecake: Plausible Deniability for Multiple Hidden Filesystems on Linux
We present Shufflecake, a new plausible deniability design to hide the
existence of encrypted data on a storage medium making it very difficult for an
adversary to prove the existence of such data. Shufflecake can be considered a
``spiritual successor'' of tools such as TrueCrypt and VeraCrypt, but vastly
improved: it works natively on Linux, it supports any filesystem of choice, and
can manage multiple volumes per device, so to make deniability of the existence
of hidden partitions really plausible.
Compared to ORAM-based solutions, Shufflecake is extremely fast and simpler
but does not offer native protection against multi-snapshot adversaries.
However, we discuss security extensions that are made possible by its
architecture, and we show evidence why these extensions might be enough to
thwart more powerful adversaries.
We implemented Shufflecake as an in-kernel tool for Linux, adding useful
features, and we benchmarked its performance showing only a minor slowdown
compared to a base encrypted system. We believe Shufflecake represents a useful
tool for people whose freedom of expression is threatened by repressive
authorities or dangerous criminal organizations, in particular: whistleblowers,
investigative journalists, and activists for human rights in oppressive
regimes.Comment: A 15-page abstract of this work appears (with the same title) in the
proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
(CCS) 2023. This is the authors' full version. This revision date:
2023-12-07. This document supersedes any previous version
Quantum Indistinguishability for Public Key Encryption
In this work we study the quantum security of public key encryption schemes
(PKE). Boneh and Zhandry (CRYPTO'13) initiated this research area for PKE and
symmetric key encryption (SKE), albeit restricted to a classical
indistinguishability phase. Gagliardoni et al. (CRYPTO'16) advanced the study
of quantum security by giving, for SKE, the first definition with a quantum
indistinguishability phase. For PKE, on the other hand, no notion of quantum
security with a quantum indistinguishability phase exists. Our main result is a
novel quantum security notion (qIND-qCPA) for PKE with a quantum
indistinguishability phase, which closes the aforementioned gap. We show a
distinguishing attack against code-based schemes and against LWE-based schemes
with certain parameters. We also show that the canonical hybrid PKE-SKE
encryption construction is qIND-qCPA-secure, even if the underlying PKE scheme
by itself is not. Finally, we classify quantum-resistant PKE schemes based on
the applicability of our security notion. Our core idea follows the approach of
Gagliardoni et al. by using so-called type-2 operators for encrypting the
challenge message. At first glance, type-2 operators appear unnatural for PKE,
as the canonical way of building them requires both the secret and the public
key. However, we identify a class of PKE schemes - which we call recoverable -
and show that for this class type-2 operators require merely the public key.
Moreover, recoverable schemes allow to realise type-2 operators even if they
suffer from decryption failures, which in general thwarts the reversibility
mandated by type-2 operators. Our work reveals that many real-world
quantum-resistant PKE schemes, including most NIST PQC candidates and the
canonical hybrid construction, are indeed recoverable
Shufflecake: Plausible Deniability for Multiple Hidden Filesystems on Linux
We present Shufflecake, a new plausible deniability design to hide the existence of encrypted data on a storage medium making it very difficult for an adversary to prove the existence of such data. Shufflecake can be considered a ``spiritual successor\u27\u27 of tools such as TrueCrypt and VeraCrypt, but vastly improved: it works natively on Linux, it supports any filesystem of choice, and can manage multiple volumes per device, so to make deniability of the existence of hidden partitions really plausible.
Compared to ORAM-based solutions, Shufflecake is extremely fast and simpler but does not offer native protection against multi-snapshot adversaries. However, we discuss security extensions that are made possible by its architecture, and we show evidence why these extensions might be enough to thwart more powerful adversaries.
We implemented Shufflecake as an in-kernel tool for Linux, adding useful features, and we benchmarked its performance showing only a minor slowdown compared to a base encrypted system. We believe Shufflecake represents a useful tool for people whose freedom of expression is threatened by repressive authorities or dangerous criminal organizations, in particular: whistleblowers, investigative journalists, and activists for human rights in oppressive regimes
Can you sign a quantum state?
Cryptography with quantum states exhibits a number of surprising and counterintuitive features. In a 2002 work, Barnum et al. argued informally that these strange features should imply that digital signatures for quantum states are impossible (Barnum et al., FOCS 2002).
In this work, we perform the first rigorous study of the problem of signing quantum states. We first show that the intuition of Barnum et al. was correct, by proving an impossibility result which rules out even very weak forms of signing quantum states. Essentially, we show that any non-trivial combination of correctness and security requirements results in negligible security. This rules out all quantum signature schemes except those which simply measure the state and then sign the outcome using a classical scheme. In other words, only classical signature schemes exist.
We then show a positive result: it is possible to sign quantum states, provided that they are also encrypted with the public key of the intended recipient. Following classical nomenclature, we call this notion quantum signcryption. Classically, signcryption is only interesting if it provides superior efficiency to simultaneous encryption and signing. Our results imply that, quantumly, it is far more interesting: by the laws of quantum mechanics, it is the only signing method available.
We develop security definitions for quantum signcryption, ranging from a simple one-time two-user setting, to a chosen-ciphertext-secure many-time multi-user setting. We also give secure constructions based on post-quantum public-key primitives. Along the way, we show that a natural hybrid method of combining classical and quantum schemes can be used to "upgrade" a secure classical scheme to the fully-quantum setting, in a wide range of cryptographic settings including signcryption, authenticated encryption, and chosen-ciphertext security
Semantic Security and Indistinguishability in the Quantum World
At CRYPTO 2013, Boneh and Zhandry initiated the study of quantum-secure encryption. They proposed first indistinguishability definitions for the quantum world where the actual indistinguishability only holds for classical messages, and they provide arguments why it might be hard to achieve a stronger notion. In this work, we show that stronger notions are achievable, where the indistinguishability holds for quantum superpositions of messages. We investigate exhaustively the possibilities and subtle differences in defining such a quantum indistinguishability notion for symmetric-key encryption schemes. We justify our stronger definition by showing its equivalence to novel quantum semantic-security notions that we introduce. Furthermore, we show that our new security definitions cannot be achieved by a large class of ciphers -- those which are quasi-preserving the message length. On the other hand, we provide a secure construction based on quantum-resistant pseudorandom permutations; this construction can be used as a generic transformation for turning a large class of encryption schemes into quantum indistinguishable and hence quantum semantically secure ones. Moreover, our construction is the first completely classical encryption scheme shown to be secure against an even stronger notion of indistinguishability, which was previously known to be achievable only by using quantum messages and arbitrary quantum encryption circuits
The Fiat-Shamir Transformation in a Quantum World
The Fiat-Shamir transformation is a famous technique to turn identification schemes into signature schemes. The derived scheme is provably secure in the random-oracle model against classical adversaries. Still, the technique has also been suggested to be used in connection with quantum-immune identification schemes, in order to get quantum-immune signature schemes. However, a recent paper by Boneh et al. (Asiacrypt 2011) has raised the issue that results in the random-oracle model may not be immediately applicable to quantum adversaries, because such adversaries should be allowed to query the random oracle in superposition. It has been unclear if the Fiat-Shamir technique is still secure in this quantum oracle model (QROM).
Here, we discuss that giving proofs for the Fiat-Shamir transformation in the QROM is presumably hard. We show that there cannot be black-box extractors, as long as the underlying quantum-immune identification scheme is secure against active adversaries and the first message of the prover is independent of its witness. Most schemes are of this type. We then discuss that for some schemes one may be able to resurrect the Fiat-Shamir result in the QROM by modifying the underlying protocol first. We discuss in particular a version of the Lyubashevsky scheme which is provably secure in the QROM
Can you sign a quantum state?
Cryptography with quantum states exhibits a number of surprising and counter-intuitive features. In a 2002 work, Barnum et al. argued that these features imply that digital signatures for quantum states are impossible [7]. In this work, we ask: can all forms of signing quantum data, even in a possibly weak sense, be completely ruled out? We give two results which shed significant light on this basic question. First, we prove an impossibility result for digital signatures for quantum data, which extends the result of [7]. Specifically, we show that no nontrivial combination of correctness and security requirements can be fulfilled, beyond what is achievable simply by measuring the quantum message and then signing the outcome. In other words, only classical signature schemes exist. We then show a positive result: a quantum state can be signed with the same security guarantees as classically, provided that it is also encrypted with the public key of the intended recipient. Following classical nomenclature, we call this notion quantum signcryption. Classically, signcryption is only interesting if it provides superior performance to encrypt-then-sign. Quantumly, it is far more interesting: it is the only signing method available. We develop “as-strong-as-classical” security definitions for quantum signcryption and give secure constructions based on post-quantum public-key primitives. Along the way, we show that a natural hybrid method of combining classical and quantum schemes can be used to “upgrade” a secure classical scheme to the fully-quantum setting, in a wide range of cryptographic settings including signcryption, authenticated encryption, and CCA security